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INTRODUCTION 
 
This short methodological manifesto investigates the Weltanschauung 
behind empiricism in comparative legal studies, which is part of a bigger 
picture aimed at establishing a true science of law.  
Apart from this introduction, the thesis consists of three chapters and a 
final closure.  
The first chapter, The Empirical Zeitgeist of Comparative Legal 
Studies, reflects on the structural stalemate experienced by comparative 
law at  the outset of the new millennium, mainly due to the centennial  
underdevelopment of its methodological foundations, which resulted in an 
inevitable saturation of traditional scholarship.  
It gives account of the renewed interaction of legal scholars with germane 
sciences and of the entry in the game of scholars from other vocational 
fields, which fostered different streams of  empirical scholarship.  
The main claim of this chapter is that those streams are only fractions of a 
full figure: they belong to the same genus, blossomed under the auspices 
of a newly established analytical  structure. Nonetheless, notwithstanding 
the shaking of critical mass which characterized the enterprise, 
comparative scholars have always devoted little if no attention to the 
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establishment of a unitary  methodological framework. This suggests that 
there is a possibility of producing cutting-edge scholarship by exploiting 
the virtuous spiral triggered by new methodological waves and that 
opportunities to produce valuable works are abundant to those  who want 
to refute  methodological  orthodoxy.   
The second chapter, On Methods: The Empirical Comparative 
Scholar As Janus Bifrons, is devoted to the design of comparative 
research, declined in its qualitative and quantitative components. First, it 
establishes what can be termed as “empirical”, and how do we 
contextualize it in comparative legal studies.  
Then, it gives account of the fact that the observational attitude embedded 
in comparative legal scholars makes them more prone to empirical analysis 
than what can be initially believed.  
Further, it claims that the reductionism inherent to a linguistic backwash 
misleadingly identifying empirical analysis as a mere investigation of 
quantitative properties, in contrast with the investigation of qualitative 
properties, is wrong because an authentic empirical approach needs to be 
strongly grounded in both of the cultures.  
It therefore reviews the features, pitfalls and potentials of the two cultures 
and discusses how triangulation, methods mixing and interdisciplinary 
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cherry-picking can play a key role in building an integrated infrastructure 
of empirical comparative studies.  
Finally, the chapter ends with the main claim that comparative scholars 
will find their long craved methodology not by replacing traditional 
comparative law, but rather by tackling and strengthening it with the 
multilayered complementariness of the qualitative and quantitative 
traditions, so to generate a scholarship which gains theoretical perspective 
via integration with observational evidence.  
In this sense, the scholar can be identified as Janus Bifrons, two-headed 
roman god which makes of unity within separation its inner strength. 
The third chapter, At The Caravanserai: Frontiers And Goals Of 
Empirical Comparative Law, revisits our journey and warns the reader 
from taking the empirical comparative enterprise with a “just do it” or 
“just don’t” approach. The scholarship requires to be handled, safeguarded 
and promoted with attention. Also, it must be not identified as and the 
one and only possible epiphany of comparative legal studies. Yet, it may 
humbly serve to those who want to take advantage of technology and 
update their methodological toolkits for dealing with a brand new wide 
array of open questions, which can in turn serve as a methodological guide 
towards a better understanding, reform and unification.  
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The chapter then discusses some potential new directions: a deeper 
attention to longitudinal studies, the introduction of behavioral analysis, 
the identification of field-specific tools and the creation of an integrated 
jargon.  
It claims that the fact that different solutions are used in order to address 
functionally equivalent problems reveals that, all in all, there is not a single 
best rule which can fit all of the legal systems into which it is imported or 
exported.  
Efficiency is just one the possible tertia comparationis, against to which 
different legal systems can be measured. Comparative scholarship can 
however assess the performance of legal rules on the basis of alternative 
polarities such as fairness, thus linking the ideal optimum to moral values 
more than to economic notions.  
This consideration makes us aware of the intrinsic degree of political 
ideology embedded in empirical comparative research, which exerts a 
considerable potential in influencing public policy. The scholarship shall 
therefore be directed towards a better understanding, unification and 
reformation of legal systems.  
Hence, comparative legal scholars shall assume a subversive role in respect 
to the legal establishment, as with regard to the means and ends they 
advocates for, as for their approach to the scholarship. They shall (re)gain 
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a role as social engineers, soaking into the basic tenet of humanist 
academia: the construction of an homo universalis, moved by an 
unquenchable thirst for knowledge and  an imaginative mind. A scholar 
who takes on his shoulders a rounded education in order to achieve the 
polymathic traits which enables him to acquire solid skills in different 
fields and methods. Such personalities being around, technology will have 
a long and difficult task in getting ahead of human beings.  
 
Rome, 25 April 2015 
Valerio Cosimo Romano 
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CHAPTER I 
THE EMPIRICAL ZEIGEIST  
OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 
 
SUMMARY: I. A structural stalemate. – II. The shifting paradigm. – III. 
Fractions of a full figure. – IV. Conclusion: past is prologue.  
I. A STRUCTURAL STALEMATE 
At the outset of the new Millennium, comparative law experiences a 
structural stalemate. While some proclaim its triumph1 and others write its 
obituary2, legions struggle in the midst, attempting to revitalize a 
scholarship doomed by a centennial underdevelopment of methodological 
foundations3. In fact, comparative scholars had started to denounce the 
                                                          
1 R. Sacco, One Hundred Years of Comparative Law, 75 Tulane Law Review, 
2001, p. 1159; E. Örücü, The Enigma of Comparative Law, Leiden, 2004.  
2 M. Siems, The End of Comparative Law, J. of Comp. Law, Vol. 2, 2007, pp. 
133-150; R. Hyland, Evening in Lisbon, in Festschrift für Claus-Wilhelm Canaris 
zum 70 Geburtstag, 2007, p. 1175.  
3 This becomes even more remarkable when one takes into consideration 
that comparative law itself might be regarded as a method. For a reference 
to comparative scholars’ disappointment, see A. Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure 
Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 Harvard International Law 
Journal pp. 221-283, 1999; W. Ewald,  Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What 
Was It Like  to Try  a Rat?, 143  U.  PA.  L. Rev. 1889,  1891, 1995;  R.  B.  
Schlesinger et al.,  Comparative  law, 1988, p. 311; M.  Reimann,  The End of 
Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 TIL. EUR.  & Civ. L.  F. 49, 
1996. 
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absence of a scientific approach already at the beginning of the 20th 
century4, at the first Congress of Comparative Law held in Paris. A 
generation later, the problem was still echoing under the trees of Harvard 
Yard5. It was only with the Grands Systèmes projects6 of the second half of 
20th century - which provided materials for doctrinal debates on single 
aspects of law which lasted for decades - that the academic focus diverted 
from the methodological question. Unreceptive of the Darwinian lesson7, 
this loop of classifications and reclassifications resulted in a progressive 
saturation of traditional scholarship8. 
                                                          
4 R. Saleilles, Conception et objet de la science du droit comparé, in Proceeds of Paris 
Congress, p. 167; G. Tarde, Le Droit comparè et la sociologie, , in Congres 
International de Droit Comparè tenu a Paris du 31 juillet au 4 août 1900, procès-
verbaux des seances et documents, 1905, p. 439. 
5 Roscoe  Pound,  What May  We  Expect From Comparative Law?,  22  
A.B.A. J.  56, 1936 p.70; ID., Comparative Law in Space and Time, 4 Amk. J.  
Comp.  L. 70, 1955. 
6 R. David, Traitè elementaire de droit civil comparè: introduction a l'étude des droits 
etrangers et la methode comparative, 1950; P. Arminjon, B.B. Nolde, M. Wolff, 
Traité de Droit Comparé Tome I, 1950; K. Zweigert, H. Kötz, Introduction to 
comparative law, 1977. 
7 After Charles Darwin, modern science (re)discovered that taxonomies 
are not the mirror of an ordo naturalis, but rather a facilitating convention in 
the systematization of available information. 
8 It is interesting to note that, according to T. Kuhn, The logic of scientific 
discovery, University of Chicago Press; 2nd edition, 1970, p. 71, the 
proliferation of different versions of a same theory is usually a symptom of 
its crisis. 
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Yet, the primigenial issue had not been addressed. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the usefulness of analytical reasoning and data collection had 
been recognized well before9 and exhortations to “look out of the cave”10 did 
certainly not lack, comparative law was still missing a solid empirical 
ground, is to say a systematic investigation of facts by either a quantitative 
or a qualitative method, or both11.  
                                                          
9 A. Nussbaum,  Die Rechtstatsachenforschung.  Ihre  Bedeutung fuer Wissenschaft 
und Unterricht, Tubingen, 1914; F. Beutel, Some Potentialities  of  Experimental 
Jurisprudence as a New Branch  of Social  Science. U. of  Neb. Press,  1957; R. 
Pound, Comparative Law in Space and Time, 4 Amk. J.  Comp.  L. 70, 1955; 
ID.,  What May  We  Expect From Comparative Law?,  22  A.B.A. J.  56, 1936; 
ID., The Place of Procedure in Modern Law, 1  S. W. L. Rev. 59, 1917; M. 
Rosenberg,  Foreword  to  Dollars, Delay and the Automobile Victim;  Studies in 
Reparation for Highway Injuries and Related Court Problems, 1968. More recently 
see R. Sacco,  Legal  formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 
Am.  J. Comp. L. 1,  25-26, 1991; U. Drobnig,  Soziologische  
Forschungsmethoden in  der Rechtsvergleichung  in  Rechtssoziologie und  
Rechtsvergleichung, 1977, p.  91.  
10 H. E. Yntema, Comparative Legal Research: Some Remarks on "Looking out of 
the Cave", Michigan Law Review Vol. 54, 7, 1956, pp. 899-928. 
11 N. W. Hines, Empirical Scholarship: What Should We Study and How Should 
We Study It?, AALS  Newsletter,  Feb.  2005; M. Reimann, The Progress and 
Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, Am. J. of 
Comp. L. Vol. 50, 4, 2002, pp. 685-686. For a fascinating catalogue of the 
many shapes of empirical legal researchers see S. Seidman Diamond, 
Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, and Plankton, 2002 U. 
Ill. L. Rev., p. 806. M. Suchman, E. Mertz, Elizabeth, A New Legal 
Empiricism? Assessing ELS and NLR, in Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science Vol. 6, 2010, pp. 555-579;  
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At the same time, the world turned global. Technology experienced an 
astonishing exponential progression. Interdisciplinary studies, which share 
empiricism as a unifying theme12, took the lead of the legal debate with the 
declared aim of reshaping the understanding of legal theory. Information 
became a massively collectible, storable and accessible commodity. New 
computational techniques, tools and hardware were developed in virtually 
every scientific field in order to produce (or as a result) of deeper and 
more sophisticated analyses13, resulting in a global trend that sees legal 
studies confronting and interfacing other sciences like never before. As a 
natural outcome, some advocated a more comprehensive systematization14 
of this interdisciplinary approach. The stepping stones for the emergence 
of a new paradigm of comparative legal studies15 were finally being built.  
                                                          
12 McAdams, T. Ulen, 2002 U. Ill. L. Review, p.791. Arguing that legal 
history can benefit from economics and statistics, D. Klerman, Statistical 
and economic approaches to legal theory, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev., p. 1167. A certain 
lack of empiricism in law and economics is instead denounced by J. 
Getman, Contributions of Empirical Data to Legal Research, 35 J. Legal Educ. 
489, 1985. 
13 T. Kuhn also recognized in its masterpiece The logic of scientific discovery, 
op. cit.,  the key-role that technology can play in the development of new 
sciences. 
14 T. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the 
Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev., 4,  p. 876. 
15 For sake of clarity, comparative legal studies are hereby defined as an 
open subject, identified as comprising of transnational inquiries about the 
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II. A SHIFTING PARADIGM 
Actually, a paradigm shift had already started to flow underground. Piled 
up with research questions that could not have been addressed with 
traditional tools, more and more scholars had gone hunting into germane 
sciences. Delving into the multicolored botany of economics, informatics 
and public policy, it took them little time to figure out that legal systems 
are huge repositories of data and metadata, strictly intertwined with 
macroeconomic factors as well as with individual incentives. Moved by the 
smooth singing of the early birds, other scholars from different vocational 
fields had then joined the hunt, carrying their toolboxes equipped with 
techniques borrowed from economics (econometrics), technology 
(software-based metrics) and public policy (agenda setting).  
                                                                                                                                                       
postulates, the implementation, the existence and the effects of legal 
norms at both a micro and  macro level. Comparative legal research is also 
implicit in all of the studies which technically fall within the range of other 
disciplines, but propose an investigation of legal topics in a comparative 
fashion.  
For a first discussion of “implicit comparative law”, see M. Siems, Comparative 
Law, Cambridge University Press, 2014 and R. A. Macdonald, K. Glover, 
Implicit comparative law, Revue de Droit: Université de Sherbrooke 43, 2013. 
See also H. Spamann, Empirical comparative law, 11 Annual Review of Law 
and Social Science, forthcoming 2015. 
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Now, one might wonder why (with the exception of few isolated cases16) 
this empirification of comparative legal studies did not occur before. 
Potential explanations are manifold: first, the uncertainty on the same 
mission and methods of the discipline; second, the relatively scarce 
demand for quantitative work, which has always been alien to legal 
scholars17; third, the persistence of a systemic lack of data and techniques 
to process such information18. At the end, it comes as no surprise that the 
enterprise resulted in “a path littered with the carcasses of earlier failed starts”19. 
                                                          
16 Isolated adventures to convey comparative legal studies toward an 
empirical analysis appeared before, but lacked fortune.  See Merryman and 
Clark for their Comparative Law - Western. European and Latin American Legal 
Systems, 1978, which frequently employs a quantitative approach  explicitly 
referring to “quantitative comparative law”.  
17 This is not anymore true: especially in the U.S. law schools show the 
clear trend of hiring scholars from other fields or lawyers who got their 
Ph.D. in other neighboring fields. For a theoretical discussion, read T. 
Ulen, Op. Cit.,  p. 900; H. M. Kritzer, The (nearly) forgotten early empirical legal 
research in Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Empirical Legal Research, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 897. For a quick 
empirical proof, have a look at the resumes of the Faculty at Stanford Law 
School. 
18 H.M. Kritzer, Op. Cit., p. 895. See also W. Landes, The Empirical Side of 
Law & Economics, U. Chi. L. Rev., 2003, pp. 167-180. 
19 The evocative picture belongs to M. Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of 
Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism , 
2002 U. Ill. L. Rev, 819, at 820. 
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If we except what can be regarded as a proto-empiricist agenda20, the first 
systematic - yet not comparative in nature - attempts to pursue empiricism 
in modern law are to be traced in the realist turn occurred during the 
‘30s21. Legal Realism, born to supplant the nineteenth century’s doctrine 
centered on legal formalism, aimed at studying law as an applied science 
and contextualizing it in society, producing efficiency-based analyses 
through the lenses of rigorous techniques and objective descriptions  
finalized to the attainment of accurate results.  
Unlike their predecessors, legal realists were also motivated by normative 
ends, by way of investigating law as it ought be via the assessment of what 
law actually is22. However, despite having realized the value of comparative 
studies23 and many of its praetorians being themselves valiant comparative 
                                                          
20 Such as Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence, which aimed at 
improving institutions via a systematic study of the actual effects of the 
law. 
21 In Jurisprudence on parade, 39 Mich. L. Rev.  1154, 1940-1941, one of the 
champions of Legal Realism, Hessel Yntema, reconducts the origins of the 
movement to two academic works: Llewellyn’s article A Realistic 
Jurisprudence – The Next  Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 1930, and J. Frank’s 
Law and the modern mind, Transaction Publishers, 1930. 
22 J.B. Fischman, Reuniting 'Is' And 'Ought' In Empirical Legal Scholarship in 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 162(1), 2013. 
23 See as example Citation: W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. 
J. 303, 1927 at 309: “In this  connection would  be made  studies  in legal history,  
and comparative law,  so  that  we  may  take  advantage  of  the  experience of  other  
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scholars24, realists failed in providing a sound theoretical framework 
relevant for normative analysis25. 
This shortfall determined a progressive draining of the scholarship already 
at the end of ‘60s, which left on the field a spurious germination of 
movements (Critical Legal Studies, Law & Society, Behavioral Analysis of 
Law et cetera). However, these studies still lacked of a comparative nature. 
The end of the Century saw a new blossoming of modern empirical legal  
studies, in correlation with the development of new computational tools, 
led by two similar yet differentiated movements, namely Empirical Legal 
Studies (ELS) and New Legal Realism (NLR), both aimed towards 
                                                                                                                                                       
times  and  other  peoples  in  solving  similar problems.” Or H.E. Yntema, 
Comparative Legal Research: Some Remarks on "Looking out of the Cave", 
Michigan Law Review Vol. 54, No. 7, 1956, at 899-928: “Under these 
conditions, it is obvious that scientific  study  of  law  must  primarily  consist  of  
comparative observation  and  analysis;  indeed,  even  if  the  existing  experimental 
knowledge  of how  law  operates  were  far  less  fragmentary  than  it is-and I for one 
do  not see  how the need and  significance  of such knowledge  could be overstated-it 
would  still have  to be  comparative, if only to make sure that what happens  in Ann 
Arbor is duplicated in Ruritania. In this sense, comparative  law is another name for 
legal science”. See also H.E. Yntema,  American  Legal  Realism  In  Retrospect, 
14 Vand. L. Rev. 317, 1960-1961, especially at 323. 
24 Llewellyn served as one of the principal drafters of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), Yntema helped establishing  the  American  
Journal  of  Comparative Law, and stressed the failure of realism to 
develop comparative analyses.  
25 J.B. Fischman, Op. Cit. 
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prescriptive ends, but the first more quantitative oriented and the other 
more sociological.   
ELS, in contrast with the rejection of doctrine that characterized the first 
realists, proposes that the same doctrine be treated as an hypothesis and 
empirically tested with the help of new quantitative techniques. ELS’ 
nature can be considered conservative: it adopts new techniques of 
analysis but formulates its own conjectures from within the realm of law, 
and not from the outside. In contrast, NLR casts it attention on a 
methodological diversity often borrowed from social sciences, without 
employing all the quantitative paraphernalia of ELS26 and is therefore to 
be considered an innovative enterprise. An intrinsic limit of these 
scholarships, however, is that both of them rarely derive the ought from the 
is27. From such premises new research streams gained momentum in 
comparative legal studies, the most structured being Comparative Law & 
Economics, the Legal Origins movement and the Doing Business reports.  
With the exception of few forerunning works28, Comparative Law & 
Economics shows up in the early 1990s29. Its study was then boosted by 
                                                          
26 M. Suchman, E. Mertz, Op. Cit. 
27 J.B. Fischman, Op. Cit. 
28 Exceptions are S. N. S. Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the 
Choice of Contractual Arrangements, 22 Journal of Law and Economics 23, 
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two academic works: a monograph by Ugo Mattei30 and three volumes 
edited by Gerrit De Geest and Roger van den Bergh31.  
The academic output then expanded to an exterminate catalog32 which 
ranges from contracts to criminal procedure, passing through labor law 
                                                                                                                                                       
1969; J. H. Merryman, D. Clark, L. M. Friedman, Law and social change in 
Mediterranean Europe and Latin America: A handbook of legal and social indicators 
for comparative study, Stanford, 1979; S. Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: 
Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 Tulane Law 
Review 235, 1986.  
29 S. Levmore, W. J. Stuntz, Remedies and Incentives in Private and Public Law: 
A Comparative Essay, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 483, 496-99, 1990; U. Mattei, R. 
Pardolesi, Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries: a Comparative Approach in 
International Review of Law and Economics 265, 1991; D. North,  Institutions,  
Institutional  Change  and  Economic  Performance, Int’l Rev. of L. and E.; F. 
Easterbrook, D. Fischel, The  Economic  Structure  of  Corporate  Law, Harvard  
University Press, 1991; J. Finsinger, T. Hoehn, A. Pototschnig, The 
Enforcement of Product Liability Rules: A Two-Country Analysis of Court Cases, 11 
International Review of Law and Economics 133, 1991; M. Roe, M. 
Ramseyer, and R. Romano, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, 
Japan, and the United States, 102 Yale Law Journal 1927, 1993; H. Schäffer, 
A. Rácz, eds. Quantitative Analyses of Law: Comparative Empirical Study: Sources 
of Law in Eastern and Western Europe, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990. 
30 U. Mattei, Comparative law and economics. University of Michigan Press, 
1997. 
31 G. de Geest, R. van den Bergh (eds), Comparative Law and Economics, in 
The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004. 
32 For a comprehensive literature review see N. Garoupa, and T. Ginsburg, 
Economic Analysis and Comparative Law, 2009; M. Bussani, U. Mattei (eds.) 
Cambridge Companion To Comparative Law; N. Garoupa, M. Pargendler, A 
Law and Economics Perspective on Legal Families in The Methodologies of Law and 
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and antitrust, up to the point that someone - maybe a little bit too 
optimistic - has already identified even  a “second wave ”33.  
The gist of this scholarship is that economic efficiency serves as a 
benchmark against which legal systems can be measured34. Scholars in this 
field believe that the analytical tools provided by economics (efficiency in 
primis) can be used to build ideal models which can be used as tertia 
comparationis in order to establish the proximity of a given system to an 
ideal optimum, or which system is more efficient in respect to a given 
aspect. In so doing, efficiency assumes itself a comparative meaning35 and 
a legal system is able to increasingly select more efficient rules through a 
                                                                                                                                                       
Economics, T. Ulen, ed., Edward Elgar, 2013. Very critical M. Siems,  
Measuring the Immeasurable: How to Turn Law into Numbers, in M. Faure, J. 
Smits (eds.) Does law matter? On law and economic growth, Intersentia, 
2011, p. 115 according to whom “the studies of implicit benchmarking are open to 
the challenge that they mislead the reader: they claim to measure the quality of legal rules 
in an objective way but in reality they only show how much countries deviate from a 
particular legal model, such as the US one”. 
33 G.K. Hadfield, The Second Wave of Law and Economics, 46 U. Toronto L.J. 
181, 1996; Adhesively R. Michaels, The Second Wave of Comparative Law and 
Economics?, University of Toronto Law Journal , vol. 59, no. 2, 197-213, 
2009. 
34 U. Mattei, A. Monti,  Comparative Law and Economics: Borrowing and 
Resistance, Global Jurist Frontiers 01/2001; R. Pardolesi, M. Granieri, The 
Future of Law Professors and Comparative Law, in The Digest. National Italian 
American Bar Association Law Journal 1-26, 2013. 
35 U. A. Mattei, L. Antoniolli, A. Rossato, Comparative Law and Economics, in 
B. Bouckaert, G. De Geest, (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. I, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2000. 
23 
 
 
review processes which progressively discard inefficient rules via periodical 
reviews36.    
According to Comparative Law & Economics’ scholars, efficiency can also 
justify divergences. In fact, different countries can develop different 
solutions for the same legal problem that are equally efficient. This 
explains legal transplants: a legal rule gets transplanted whenever it 
increases the efficiency of the receiving system37.  
For sure, a great merit which can be ascribed to this scholarship is that, in 
contrast with the Chicago School that has traditionally imposed its 
dominion on Law & Economics without having a deep historical and 
comparative perspective, Comparative Law & Economics provided such a 
facet38. Unfortunately, Comparative L&E has (up to now) failed to 
establish a comprehensive and coherent methodological framework to 
                                                          
36 F. Parisi, V. Fon, The economics of lawmaking, Oxford University Press, 
2009. 
37 U. A. Mattei, L. Antoniolli, A. Rossato, Op. Cit.  
38 R. Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing 
Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 765-795, 2009.  
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validate or falsify the proposed theories39, so it certainly needs further 
technical refinement40. 
Up to the 1990s, the economic analysis of law had casted its attention on 
how norms influence the individual incentives and the behavior of 
microeconomic players. In 1997, “Law and Finance”, the well-known 
seminal paper written by a group of economists collectively known under 
the acronym LLSV41, reversed the perspective by operating comparisons 
at a macro level.  
LLSV pose that legal rules and regulation differ remarkably among States; 
that this difference is due to a great extent to legal origins, the most 
important divide being between common law and civil law; that these 
differences can be quantified and present a basic historical divergence: 
whereas civil law is policy implementing, common law is market 
supporting. Since law “matters” for economic and social development and 
                                                          
39 See C. Rogers, Gulliver's Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of Comparative 
Law, in 67 George Washington Law Review 149, 1998.  
40 M. Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of 
the Twentieth Century, The Am. J. of Comp. Law Vol. 50, 4, 2002, pp. 671-
700.  
41 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W Vishny, Law and 
Finance, 106 Journal of Political Economy 6, 1998, p. 1113-1155. 
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common law is believed to be more efficient in doing so, it follows that 
the latter fosters growth.  
Needless to be said, this finding light the fuse for a bone-crushing polemic 
with civil law scholars42. But if we leave apart the legitimate parochialisms, 
it becomes clear that the value of LLSV’s contribution does not rest in its 
contingent findings, which are limited in scope to the relationship between 
law and finance. Rather, it is remarkable that it employs quantitative 
methods to address comparative law problems under a macroeconomic 
eye.  
Needless to be reported, Law and Finance has not been exempted from a 
multitude of technical as well as cultural criticisms (inter alia, overreliance 
on ordinary least squares regression43, omitted variable bias44, coding 
problems45, concerns on the use of proxies46, overestimation of the 
                                                          
42 See N. Garoupa, C. Gómez Ligüerre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the 
Common Law, Boston University International Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2, 
2011. 
43 See K. Pistor, Rethinking the Law and Finance Paradigm, BYU L. Rev., p. 
1647, 2009. 
44 See J.D. Angrist & J.-S. Pischke, The Credibility Revolution in Empirical 
Economics: How Better Research Design Is Taking the Con out of Econometrics, 24 J. 
Econ. Persp. 3, 2010.  
45 H. Spamann, Holger, The “antidirector rights index” revisited, 23.2 Rev. of 
Fin. Stud., 467-486, 2010. 
26 
 
 
dualism between civil law and common law47, multicollinearity, reductivity 
of binary variables, western-centricity of the analysis et cetera).  
All these critiques are brilliantly captured in a trenchant paper48 in which, 
using LLSV’s approach, the Author examines the relation between legal 
protections and soccer success and finds out that French origin was 
significant, thus coming to the conclusion that “perhaps teams from countries 
with systems based on the French model […] perform well due to the remaining vestiges 
of the Napoleonic Code […]. Or maybe – just maybe – some other forces are at 
work.”. Another trivial correlation is then found by whom (in a less satirical 
fashion) finds out that French civil law countries deforest less than English 
common law ones49. Despite the infamous jokes, Law and Finance 
                                                                                                                                                       
46 J. Reitz, Legal Origins, Comparative Law, and Political Economy, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2009; J.B. Fischman, Op. Cit.  
47 In this respect, it is symptomatic that one of the most prominent 
Authors of grands systèmes classifications, Hein Kötz, acknowledged that 
legal families are nothing more than “a didactical tool”. See H.  Kötz,  
Abschied  von  der  Rechtskreislehre?  [Farewell  to  the  Theory  of  Legal  
Families?],  6 Zeitschrift Für Europasches Privatrecht 493, 1998. Yet, the 
divide does remain relevant for civil procedure, which is still different 
among these legal families. See R. Michaels, Op. Cit. 
48 M. West, Legal Determinants of World Cup Success. Michigan Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 02-009, 2002. 
49 S. Marchand, Legal Origin, Colonial Origins and Deforestation, Economics 
Bulletin, vol. 32(2), 2002, pp. 1653-1670. 
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remains a fundamental piece of scholarship as it paved the way for the 
development of quantitative macro-comparison.  
Another stream of empirical comparative legal studies is represented by 
the Doing Business reports issued by the World Bank since 2004, and their 
collateral projects50. In particular, the report measures and compare the 
ease of doing business in more than 130 countries. The project is led by 
Simeon Djankov, a frequent coauthor with LLS, and relies strongly on the 
legal origins hypothesis to advocate for reforms in low-performing 
Countries. As it has been highlighted, a fundamental difference with the 
Legal Origins thesis stands in the fact that while its conclusions are mostly 
descriptive, the Doing Business enterprise is instead openly evaluative51. 
The report suffered from critiques as well. A first criticism regards its 
innate tendency to neglect fairness and justice in favor of deregulation52.  
                                                          
50 The  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development,  the 
Canadian International Development Agency, the UK Department for 
International  Development,  name just a few;  the Inter-American  
Development Bank, European Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  
Development,  Asian  Development Bank,  African  Development  Bank;'  
other  multilateral  financial institutions  like  the  World  Bank; United 
Nations Development Program. the National Center for  State  Courts,  
the  Federal  Judicial  Center. 
51 Ralf Michaels, Op. Cit. 
52 As an example, the use until 2008 of EWI, the “employing workers 
indicator”, has been very controversial because it captured the ease of 
hiring and firing a worker, thus stimulating a race to the bottom. 
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A second criticism regards the insufficient knowledge of the law, especially 
law in action.  
Third, the Reports have been also charged of a simplistic use of rankings, 
which fostered countries to enact useless reforms in order just to climb 
positions53.  
Fourth, the use of indicators54 and the fact that they are based on perceived 
law more than actual  law. The scope of the project is also very narrow, 
since it only regards the relationship between law and business (which 
might not even be considered as belonging to legal analysis) and can be 
questioned under political grounds: indeed, it represents a neoliberal 
project aimed at supporting laissez faire markets at an institutional level55. 
Thus, it suffers of the uniqueness of its premises and of its public policy 
suggestions.  
                                                          
53 See Ralf Michaels, Op. Cit. 
54 See T. Almeida Cravo, What’s in a label? The aid community’s representations 
of success and failure in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge 
University, 2012; T. Krever, Quantifying Law: Legal Indicator Projects and the 
Reproduction of Neoliberal Common Sense, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, 
2013.  
55 T Krever, Op. Cit. On the inherent political connotation of empirical 
reaseach, see M. McConville. Research methods for law, Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007. 
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As we will appreciate in a while, when we will reconstruct the current 
scenario, all of the empirical streams that have been just described are only 
tangential to our research. In fact, notwithstanding the shaking of critical 
mass which followed these new scholarships, little if no attention has been 
devoted in establishing a unitary methodological framework. The idiomatic 
elephant is being missed in the room56.  
III. FRACTIONS OF A FULL FIGURE 
 
One shall not miss the forest for the trees. The abovementioned projects 
are only fractions of a full figure: they belong to the same genus of 
empirical analysis of comparative law57, in both its quantitative and 
qualitative declinations. 
In Kuhnian terms, this three species share the essential characteristics of a 
paradigm. First, their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented. Second, 
                                                          
56 M. Siems, Comparative Law - Who is the Elephant in the Room? (Book 
Review of 'Comparative Law: A Handbook', Örücü and Nelken, eds.), 
Edinburgh Law Review, 12, 2008, pp. 334-336. 
57 Also referred to as being a category of leximetrics, the quantitative 
measurement of law. On the point see M. Siems and S. Deakin, Comparative 
Law and Finance: Past, Present and Future Research, in Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics (JITE) 166, 2010;  R. D. Cooter and T. Ginsburg, 
Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws are Longer in Some Countries Than Others, U. Ill. 
Law & Econ. Research Paper LE 03-012, 2003; H. Spamann, Large-Sample, 
Quantitative Research Designs for Comparative Law?, Am. J. Comp. L. 57.4, 797-
810, 2009. 
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it was sufficiently open ended to leave all sorts of problem open58. Third, 
the overlapping of old methods and new methods denotes a 
reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals59. 
It follows that the envisaged approach has to be considered evolutionary 
more than revolutionary60. It is nothing else than the usual developmental 
pattern of science, which blossoms under the auspices of a newly 
established analytical framework.  
Resistance is structurally positive61: by resisting, the incumbent paradigm 
tests the strength of the entrant. At that point, it is all a matter of 
breakpoints. As society does, also scholarship advances coffin by coffin.  
Hessel Yntema carves this phenomenon in his brilliant prose: “None are  
more requited by friendly admonition or polemic animadversion  than  those who  
venture into the lonely and unbeaten paths of science. And criticism is a grateful form of 
recognition, for it betrays a degree of apprehension, which promises that even those who 
                                                          
58 T. Kuhn, Op. Cit., p. 10. 
59 T. Kuhn, Op. Cit., p. 85. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 1970; I. 
Lakatos further highlighted that new ideas are almost always conceived ad-
hoc and then progressively extended. 
60 T. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the 
Scientific Method in the Study of Law, in University of Illinois Law Review, No. 
4., 2002, p. 886. 
61 Resisting on the validity of a paradigm by premising the very same 
paradigm is never advisable. See T. Kuhn, Op. Cit., p. 94. 
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come to scoff may perhaps remain to pray” 62. Now, one may wonder about the 
existence of a real necessity for new analytical tools. And in fact, a well-
known scholar63 unearthed a Nietzschean caveat: the reduction of all 
qualities to quantities would be Unsinn, nonsense64.  
He is right. Mere reductions are perfectly useless and indeed disruptive: 
complementariness shall be the polar star, for we should not forget that 
each methodology, be it qualitative or quantitative in its inner nature, 
comes out with important limitations65. To the maximum extent possible, 
we do not want to stumble over such fallacies. Instead, by helping 
ourselves with a twofold unitary method, we want to drive the potential 
pitfalls of our research out of its results.  
                                                          
62 E. Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 Colum. L. Rev.  925, 
1931. The author further adds p. 935 that “It  is  inevitable  that  a nascent  
empirical  legal  science,  now  at the threshold  of  its  endeavors,  should be put  to  its 
formal  justification,  before  it can be  in fact proved. It  is altogether  advantageous  
that it should be  so.  Necessarily,  the event  will decide  the  issue of  the scientific 
movement  in  law,  but  in the meantime  differences  of  opinion  can  be clarified  or  
even perhaps  shown to be the unfortunate  progeny  of  misunderstanding  or verbal  
ambiguity”.  
63 P. Legrand, Econocentrism, 59 U. Toronto L.J. 215, 2009. 
64 F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, W. Kaufmann (ed.), New York: Vintage, 
1968 at 304 §564 “Die Reduktion aller Qualitäten auf Quantitäten ist Unsinn”. 
65 For a first analysis of the need for methodological integration see L.B. 
Nielsen, The Need For Multi-Method Approaches In Empirical Legal Research, in 
Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical 
Legal Research, Oxford University Press, 2010.  
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Indeed, in announcing that the two methodologies should be intended as 
complementary66 we are automatically letting Comparative Law gain 
theoretical and practical perspectives from their integration67.   
As an eclectic philosopher of science puts it out, “an experience without theory 
is just as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) a theory without experience: eliminate part of 
the theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject and you have a person who is completely 
disoriented and incapable of carrying out the simplest action”68. 
Let us make the example of a case study. Taken in itself, and because of 
the irrelevance of the sample, it would not be sufficient for proving true 
any general hypothesis. However, we can use it to generate a theory which 
we can later test with the collection of the appropriate data. Or, vice versa, 
                                                          
66 R. Schlesinger et al., Comparative law: cases, text, materials. Foundation 
Press, 1970, p. 40: “thus becomes an important auxiliary method for the social 
scientist just as the latter’s findings in turn are used as indispendable tools by those 
shaping law and policy in our society”. 
67 R. Schlesinger et al., Op. Cit., p. 39: “The reformer who strives to improve the 
law may resort to social science methods in order to gather empirical data demonstrating 
the unsatisfactory effects of an existing rule. But when he seeks to explore the probable 
effects of proposed alternative solutions, the methods of social science have to be 
supplemented by those of comparative law.”. See also H. Spamann, Op. Cit.; J. 
Reitz, Legal Origins, Comparative Law, and Political Economy, Am. J. of Comp. 
L., Vol. 57, No. 3, 2009; T. Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of 
Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns, Cornell Legal Studies 
Research Paper, 2010. 
68 P.K.  Feyerabend,  Against  Method:  Outline  of  an  Anarchistic  Theory  of 
Knowledge, Verso Edition, London, 1978, p. 137. 
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we can start from the aggregate analysis of a given feature, elaborate a 
theory, and then check the robustness of our conjecture. We can design 
quantitative work as preceded by qualitative exploratory work, do the 
contrary69, or even use mixed structures (qualitative – quantitative – 
qualitative; quantitative – qualitative – quantitative), but what really matters 
is that we work on two levels of an unitary analysis which allows us to 
gather and process large data sets by quantitative means and to gain in-
depth narrative from qualitative analysis70, adopting the different 
methodologies to the different goals pursued by our analysis. 
A scientific inquiry into comparative law can be indicted under many 
different grounds. First of all, it can be argued that legal phenomena are 
not susceptible of exact measurement. Law - one might argue - consists of 
an inherently normative, ideal world that has no correspondence with 
reality, while empirical research is instead inherently descriptive71, and intuition 
alone cannot suffice to relate observable data to normative claims. 
Actually, this is the reason why legal scholarship needs to build the 
                                                          
69 L.B. Nielsen, Op. Cit., at 955. 
70 See J.W. Cioffi, Legal Regimes and Political Particularism: An Assessment of the 
Legal Families Theory from the Perspectives of Comparative Law and Political 
Economy, Byu L. Rev. 1501, 2009, especially pp. 1532 and 1533. 
71 J. B. Fischman, Op. Cit. 
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conceptual framework that can bridge the gap between ‘is’  and  ‘ought.’  
Indeed, developing  such  framework  will  require  a  sustained  agenda  
that integrates empirical methodologies with legal theory72, in order to let 
key assumptions be identified and transformed into hypotheses amenable 
to the rigors of empirical testing73, which can in turn generate effective 
policy recommendations. In effect, even if data themselves have no 
intrinsic normative significance, every respectable empirical study builds 
upon normative premises. It is just that they are formulated as measures74 
and not as propositions. Holding data constant, the more credible the 
measure, the more effective the policies75. 
Obviously, “justifying  a  metric  requires  two steps.  First,  one  needs  a  theory  of  
the  good.  […] Second,  one  needs  to  relate  observable  phenomena  to  the measure  
of goodness.  When  good  or  bad  outcomes  are  directly  measurable—such  as when 
the outcomes of a medical trial are “survival” and “death”—the results will be self-
interpreting and no deeper theory is needed”. 
                                                          
72 J. B. Fischman, Op. Cit. 
73 M. Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial 
Decision Making and the New Empiricism, U. Ill. L. Rev., 2002, p. 827. 
74 J. B. Fischman, Op. Cit. 
75 J. B. Fischman, Op. Cit. 
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Empirical analysis can therefore build a scientific infrastructure of 
comparative legal studies by notably reducing the innate subjectivity of law 
so to let sound theories emerge from constant testing against experience76, 
in order to reveal features of law that are obscure to the common sense77. 
Another possible criticism is that law is inherently not predictable78. This  
myth is as old as the attribution of thunderstorms to the wrath of God: 
legal outcomes have become always more and more predictable, on the 
one side because of the scaffolding provided by doctrine, precedents and 
praxis, and on the other side because of the emergence of legal certainty as 
a human right. It is all a matter of investigating and properly identifying 
the hidden regularities of legal doctrine79. 
Also, acquiring fluency in empirical analysis allows the interpreter to 
investigate her hypotheses via an “endless process of testing and retesting80, rather 
than confining it in the hyperuranium of her mind. This implies that she 
                                                          
76 M. A. Glendon  et al.,  Comparative  Legal Traditions, 2d rev. ed., 1994. 
77 D. Galligan, Legal Theory and Empirical Research in Oxford Handbook Of 
Empirical Legal Studies, P. Cane, H. Kritzer (eds.), Oxford University Press, 
2010;   
78 “If  it be  not  so,  are  not  lawyers  consummate  charlatans!”. H. Yntema, Legal 
Science and Reform, 34 Columbia Law Review 2, 1934, p. 209. 
79 H. Dagan, Reconstructing American Legal Realism & Rethinking Private Law 
Theory, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 45. 
80 B. Cardozo, The nature of the judicial process, 1921, p. 179. 
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can design legal questions differently, so to obtain different answers, that 
would have never been captured otherwise. She can unveil aspects that 
were before diaphanous to a traditional analysis.  
In addition, being by definition universally testable, the empirical approach 
speaks the lingua franca needed to elucidate the quandaries of the 
polycontextual law81 originating from a legal world reshaped by 
globalization. A last objection might derive from an innate skepticism 
towards the use of unconventional tools which are alien to the legal 
academia. Bearing well in mind that “technique is noticed most markedly in the 
case of those who have not mastered it”82, scholars shall understand that toolkits 
belonging to different disciplines are not in contrast with each other but 
shall be carefully and appropriately handled, only after intensive training 
and proper digestion. Indeed, the very same chisel can make an artist or a 
butcher. Given that the scholar learns how to use her knives, the problem 
becomes cultural more than technical.  
 
                                                          
81 V. Grosswald Curran, Comparative Law and the Legal Origins Thesis: '[N] On 
Scholae Sed Vitae Discimus', American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 57, 
2009.  
82 L. Trotsky, Literature and Revolution, 1923, ed. William Keach, Chicago 
2005, p. 168. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: PAST IS PROLOGUE 
In sum, we have highlighted the structural stalemate experienced by 
comparative legal studies, heightened by the progressive saturation of 
traditional scholarship originating from the loop of taxonomies occurred 
in connection with the Grands Systèmes  of the last Century.  
As a result, more and more legal scholars have resorted to germane 
sciences. At the same time, scholars from other vocational fields have 
joined the game carrying their toolboxes and techniques. Surprisingly, 
notwithstanding the consequential shaking of critical mass, comparative 
scholars has up to now devoted little if no attention to the establishment 
of an unitary methodological framework. In fact, one shall not miss the big 
picture: all these of these streams belong to the same genus of empirical 
measurement of comparative law, articulated in both its quantitative and 
qualitative components. The overlapping of old and new methods also 
denotes a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals: it is nothing 
else than the usual developmental pattern of science, which blossoms 
under the auspices of a newly established analytical structure. This suggests 
that it is still possible to produce cutting-edge scholarship by exploiting the 
virtuous spiral triggered by such new research streams, and that, even if a 
universal formula does not - unsurprisingly - exist, opportunities to 
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produce valuable works are abundant to those who want to refute 
methodological orthodoxy. And what is past becomes prologue83. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
83 Borrowed from W. Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act 2, Scene I. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
ON METHODS:  
THE EMPIRICAL COMPARATIVE 
SCHOLAR AS JANUS BIFRONS 
 
 
SUMMARY: I. What counts as “empirical”? - II. Qualitative methods - III. 
Quantitative methods - IV. Triangulation, methods mixing and  
interdisciplinary cherry-picking. - V. Janus Bifrons.  
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT COUNTS AS “EMPIRICAL”? 
 
In V. Palmer’s worlds “method is now identified by the ‘techniques’ by which 
comparisons are carried out”84. Before proceeding further, we thus need to 
define the object of our study, id est what counts as empirical, and how do 
we contextualize it in the comparative legal setting85.  
                                                          
84 V. Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law 
Methodology,  in  53 Am.  J.  of  Comp.  Law, 262, 2005. 
85 For a general discussion of the topics which will come to relevance in 
this chapter, see: J. Angrist, J.-S. Pischke, Mastering Metrics: The Path from 
Cause to Effect, Princeton University Press, 2014; Id., The Credibility 
Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design Is Taking the Con 
out of Econometrics, 24 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 2010; M. Armer, A. Grimshaw 
(eds.), Comparative social research: methodological problems and strategies, Wiley, 
1973; H. Brady, D. Collier (eds.),  Rethinking  social  inquiry:  diverse  tools, 
shared standards,  2010; H. Brady, Do Two Research Cultures Imply Two Scientific 
Paradigms?, 46.2 Comp. Pol. Stud. 252-265, 2013; A. Bryman, Social research 
methods, Oxford University Press, 2012; H. Chodosh, Comparing 
Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 1025, 1998-1999; W. 
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Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303, 1927; J. Creswell, 
Research design: Qualitative and quantitative research approaches, 1994; Id., Research 
design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches, Sage publications, 
2013; L. Epstein, G. King, The  rules  of inference,  69  U. Chi. L.  Rev.  1, 
2002; Id., Building an Infrastructure for Empirical Research in the Law, 53 J. Legal 
Educ. 311, 2003; L. Epstein, A. Martin, An introduction to empirical legal 
research, Oxford University Press, 2014; W. Firestone, Meaning in method: The 
rhetoric of quantitative and qualitative research, 16.7 Educational researcher 16-
21, 1987; D. Galligan, Legal Theory and Empirical Research in Oxford Handbook 
Of Empirical Legal Studies, P. Cane, H. Kritzer (eds.), Oxford University 
Press, 2010; B. Geddes, How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: 
Selection Bias in Comparative Politics, 2 Pol. Analysis 131, 1990; J. Gerring, 
How good is good enough? A multidimensional, best-possible standard for research 
design, 64.3 Political Research Quarterly 625-636, 2011; J. Getman, 
Contributions of Empirical Data to Legal Research, 35 J. Legal Educ. 489, 1985; 
G. Goertz, J. Mahoney,  A tale of two cultures: Qualitative and quantitative 
research in the social sciences, Princeton University Press, 2012; J. Goldsmith, 
A. Vermeule, Empirical methodology and legal scholarship, Un. Chic. L. Rev. 
153-167, 2002; J. Greene, Engaging critical issues in social inquiry by mixing 
methods, 56.6 American Behavioral Scientist 755-773, 2012; R. Hastie, The 
Challenge to Produce Useful “Legal Numbers”, 8.1 Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies 6-20, 2011; D. Ho, D. Rubin, Credible causal inference for empirical legal 
studies, 7 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 17-40, 2011; K. Howe, 
M. Eisenhart, Standards for qualitative (and quantitative) research: a prolegomenon, 
19.4 Educational researcher 2-9, 1990; T. Jick, Mixing qualitative and 
quantitative methods: Triangulation in action, Administrative Science Quarterly 
602-611, 1979; G. King, R. Keohane, S. Verba, Designing social inquiry: 
Scientific inference in qualitative research, Princeton University Press, 1994; R. 
Lawless, J. Robbennolt, T. Ulen, Empirical methods in law, Aspen Publishers, 
2010; S. Mathison, Sandra, Why triangulate?, 17.2 Educational researcher 13-
17, 1988; J. Maxwell, Using numbers in qualitative research, 16.6 Qualitative 
Inquiry 475-482, 2010; M. Mcconville, Development of empirical techniques and 
theory in research methods for law, in M. McConville, W Chui (eds.), Research 
methods for law, Edinburgh University Press, 2010; L. Nielsen, The Need 
For Multi-Method Approaches In Empirical Legal Research, in Peter Cane & 
Herbert M. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research, 
Oxford University Press, 2010; C. Ragin, The comparative method: Moving 
beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies, Univ. of California Press, 2014; J. 
Robbennolt, Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using Empirical Research in 
Law and Policy, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 777, 2003; H. Spamann, Large-Sample, 
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We have already briefly touched upon the issue in the previous chapter, 
reporting that the empiricism is based upon a systematic investigation of 
facts by either a quantitative or a qualitative method, or both.  
Empirical analysis does not come as a novelty for the legal academia86, nor 
it does so for comparative legal studies, which imply field observations at 
an ontological level.  
If it is true - as it is, indeed - that contemporary legal scholars cannot 
remain confined in an ideal ivory tower, but have instead to go outside and 
look at how the law in action performs at a given point in time and space, 
it is even more true that this attitude is even more pronounced in 
comparative legal scholars, who have always recognized that their 
enterprise requires them to backpack their own domestic knowledge and 
venture into the exploration of new lands, languages and times87, with at 
least the same strive for curiosity and understanding which characterizes 
the mythical protagonist of the Flammarion engraving.   
                                                                                                                                                       
Quantitative Research Designs for Comparative Law?, 57.4 Am. J. Comp. L. 797-
810, 2009; Id., Empirical comparative law, 11 Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science, forthcoming 2015. 
86 In two distinguished scholar’s words, “[a]lthough the term “empirical 
research” has become commonplace in legal scholarship over the past two decades, law 
professors have in fact been conducting research that is empirical—that  is, learning 
about the world using quantitative data or qualitative information—for almost as long 
as they have been conducting research.” L. Epstein, G. King, The  rules  of inference,  
69  U. Chi. L.  Rev.  1, 2002. 
 
87 The role of diachrony is to be briefly discussed in the following chapter.  
42 
 
 
Thus, it is not surprising to recognize that comparative legal scholars are 
the natural anthropologists of law, as their afflatus towards comparison 
inevitably requires them to look out of their own world, manifesting an 
ethnographic attitude which is empirical in nature.  
This being premised, it is evident that the comparatists’ natural tendency 
to refer to what they observe even before their theoretical ponderings 
makes them more prone to empirical analysis than what we had originally 
believed.  
Notwithstanding the above, maybe also because of the relative youth of 
comparative law as an autonomous subject, up to now empiricism has not 
been one of the main features of their theoretical framework. This 
separation is made evident even by semantic questions.  
Indeed, first of all, we must relocate ourselves out of a linguistic backwash. 
In fact, empirical analysis has often too misleadingly being identified as a 
mere investigation of properties which are quantitative in nature (i.e. refer 
to quantifiable processes of measurement), as often plainly contrasted to 
qualitative properties (which are mainly built upon logic). However, this 
reductionism proves immediately to be wrong88: an authentic empirical 
approach shall be strongly grounded in both of the cultures. And this 
                                                          
88 Nonetheless, great part of empirical comparative legal studies is 
quantitative in nature. 
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constitutes the main reason why, despite the quantitative culture being 
often the one most referred to when commonly speaking about 
empiricism, in order to discern between the two approaches, the use of 
numbers is certainly not a good proxy89.  
To make it clear, qualitative studies often contain references to numbers 
and measures90 inasmuch as quantitative studies often require deeply 
grounded logical premises.  
Sometimes, indeed, qualitative studies have to rely on what has been 
termed as “quasi statistical findings”, i.e. terms indicating the recurrence of a 
given event. Therefore, the conclusions built on such tools are nothing 
more than “hidden inferences”, obtained via rigorous logical processes. 
Disentangling the two is therefore an extremely grievous enterprise. For 
this reason, rather than of “paradigms” one shall investigate the two aspects 
referring to them as “research designs”, both built upon the formulation of 
an hypothesis, subsequent observations and the final statement of a certain 
claim.  
                                                          
89 See J. Maxwell, Using numbers in qualitative research, 16.6 Qualitative 
Inquiry 475-482, 2010 and R. Lawless, J. Robbennolt, T. Ulen, Empirical 
methods in law, Aspen Publishers, 2010. 
90 This view is challenged by H. Becker, Field work evidence, in H. Becker, 
Sociological work: Method and substance, New Brunswick, 1970. The 
Author argues that even qualitative researchers often adopts quantitative 
claims in a verbal fashion.  
 
44 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the attention 
paid by social sciences to research designs91. Insofar, however, this 
renewed interest has been neglected by comparative law, which has rather 
focused on analyzing the data gathered from grands systèmes.  
The following pages will therefore to provide a general overview in order 
to lay out the methodological foundations of our analysis.  
                                                          
91 See J. Gerring, How good is good enough? A multidimensional, best-possible 
standard for research design, 64.3 Political Research Quarterly 625-636, 2011 
and L. Epstein, G. King, op. cit.: “The tradition of including some articles devoted 
exclusively to the methodology of empirical analysis—so well represented in journals in 
traditional academic fields—is virtually nonexistent in the nation’s law reviews. As a 
result, readers learn considerably less accurate information about the empirical world 
than the studies’ stridently stated, but  overly  confident,  conclusions  suggest.”.  
Another (long) quote from the same Authors comes very handy: “But  
empirical  research,  as  natural  and  social  scientists  recognize,  is  far  broader  than 
these  associations  suggest.  The  word  “empirical”  denotes  evidence about  the  world  
based  on  observation  or  experience. That  evidence can  be  numerical  (quantitative)  
or  nonnumerical  (qualitative); neither is any more “empirical” than the other. What 
makes research empirical is that it is based on observations of the At the same time, the 
current state of empirical legal scholarship is deeply flawed. […] the articles devoted to 
methodology  in  these  disciplines—is  virtually  nonexistent  in  the  nation’s law 
reviews. a whole field cannot count  on  others  with  differing  goals  and  perspectives  
to  solve  all  of the  problems  that  law  professors  may  face. Quite  the  opposite: 
scholars  must  have  the  flexibility  of  mind  to  overturn  old  ways  of looking at the 
world, to ask new questions, to revise their blueprints as necessary, and to collect more 
(or different) data than they might have intended. It may be that, after amassing the 
evidence for which the design  calls,  the  scholar  finds  an  imperfect  fit  among  it,  the  
main  re-search questions, and the theory. Rather than erasing months or even years of 
work, the investigator certainly should return to the drawing board, design more 
appropriate procedures, or even recast the original research question. Indeed, often when 
researchers find that data turn out to be inconsistent with a hypothesis, they immediately 
see a new hypothesis that apparently explains the otherwise anomalous empirical 
results.”. 
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In effect, pinpointing two interesting quotes can give us some starting 
coordinates. According to Donald Rubin, “design trumps analysis”92 but, as 
Steve Jobs rebates, “design is not about how things look, but it is about how things 
work”93.  
So we end up waking in the consciousness that there are no paradigms at 
war, but that different methodologies are virtually construed on different 
research designs, which are selected depending on the degree of 
confidence of their users on that methodology,  and may well serve to 
diverse functions94. The field of our game is thus represented by the 
methodological fields: our green pastures. 
In the preceding lines we have briefly highlighted that there is a factual 
convergence between the two designs. We shall now ask ourselves how to 
distinguish the two, also in order to highlight and contrast the respective 
main features, with a particular eye for what becomes relevant for 
comparative legal scholars.  
In primis, we can ask ourselves whether the “explanatory versus descriptive” 
dualism can be a good theoretical divide. And we shall almost immediately 
                                                          
92 D. Rubin, For objective causal inference, design trumps analysis, Annals of 
Applied Statistics, 808-840, 2008. 
93
 Watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sPfJQmpg5zk. 
 
94 For a discussion of which, see infra. 
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say that no, this would not be a good criterion: empirical comparative 
research can well be either descriptive or inferential, or both. In particular, 
descriptive research may provide us all the information needed in order to 
examine the object(s) of our comparison, and inferential research can 
show us the causal relationships behind a given problem.  
Then, we can ask ourselves whether dividing the two methods in a-
theoretical (quantitative) versus theoretical (qualitative) analysis can be 
good divide. The answer is already implied in our previous analysis. That 
would not be the case. The empirical paradigm, which relies on both the 
designs, encompasses theories as well as methods95. Any numerical 
analysis needs a theoretical underpinning, and any theory needs at least 
some data in order to be falsified.  
We can now ask ourselves whether a more factual element like the size of 
the sample can be useful in order to discern between the two. That is again 
not the case. Indeed, in comparative studies (albeit this may seem 
counterintuitive) the size of the sample is always destined to remain 
relatively small, and reliable general patterns may not be evident despite 
measuring almost any of the available units of observation. This is the 
                                                          
95 L. Epstein, A. Martin, An introduction to empirical legal research, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, p. 1. 
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reason why, in order to be able to establish robust causal relationships 
advanced tools are almost always necessary96.  
So, in the end, what is the empirical comparative studies’ main feature? 
The answer is given to us by Arthur Conan Doyle in The Adventure of the 
Copper Beeches: “Data! Data! Data! I can’t make bricks without clay!”.  
Data are thus the distinctive feature of empirical comparative law, as well 
as the basis upon which the design of a given research is based, both ex 
ante (depending on their availability) and ex post (as of their results). Data 
indeed represents both the testing tool for theoretical hypotheses and their 
final evidence.  
One common belief for not establishing a sound empirical methodology 
of comparative legal studies is that they would require data which are not 
available or are qualitatively too weak97. This is another false myth which 
shall be immediately uncovered.  
Plainly put: the systemic lack of data for comparative analysis is a false 
problem. First, all data accumulated in the past with the extensive 
researches on grands systèmes are available and can be of great help, also in a 
diachronic perspective. Second, we now have all the technical tools and 
                                                          
96 M. Siems, Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press, 2014 
97 Also in regard to weak data, see infra. 
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the information flows needed to collect massive quantities of data (the so 
called and overhyped “big data”). Third, nowadays data are often available 
for free, and even in case they are not, they can be traded, as a robust 
market for data98 exists.  
Notwithstanding, it can be conceded that sometimes data might not be 
available for many units of observation (id est  countries, regions or topics) 
and this is certainly an issue to be taken into due account99.  
Indeed, the major danger is that the availability of data “determines what we 
as scholars can actually study”100, and this is certainly risky101. 
Having briefly outlined our general framework, we shall now review the 
features, pitfalls and potentials of the two methods for the study of 
comparative law. We will first address the qualitative method because as it 
is the most traditional for legal analysis, and then the quantitative, which is 
considered to be more progressive.  
                                                          
98 E. Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in 
Shaping the Law, 1 Wisc. Law Rev., 2002, p. 3.  
99 H. Spamann, Empirical comparative law, 11 Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science, forthcoming 2015, p. 2.  
100 P. Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 Harvard Law Review 
838, 1921-1922. 
101 Also on this topic, see infra.  
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We will then see how triangulation102, methods mixing and 
interdisciplinary cherry-picking can play a key role in building an integrated 
infrastructure of empirical comparative studies.  
The main claim of this chapter is that comparative scholar will find its long 
craved methodology by identifying itself in a true Janus Bifrons, the two-
headed roman god which makes of unity within separation its strength.  
Indeed, the multilayered complementariness of the qualitative and 
quantitative capita will be able to generate a scholarship which gains 
theoretical perspective via integrating itself with observational evidence so 
to reinforce the idea of comparative law as a science103.  
This approach, however, is not called for in order to replace “traditional” 
comparative law (which as a subject stands apart from the methods that 
we use for assessing it) but rather to tackle and strengthen it on a different 
methodological premise.  
In this view, the use of both methods, in particular the less travelled 
quantitative one, shall be not be intended as alternative to a traditional 
                                                          
102 The term “triangulation” designates the combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methodologies used to supplement, enhance and test the 
validity of the results in the study of the same phenomenon, moving from 
the assumption that any inherent bias would be canceled out. For an in-
depth analysis see N. Denzin, Triangulation 2.0, 6.2 Journal of Mixed 
Methods Research 80-88, 2012. 
 
103
 H. Chodosh, Comparing comparisons: in search of methodology, 84 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1025, 1998-1999. 
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study of comparative law, but rather as one of its extensions. We are about 
to discover why and how. 
II. QUALITATIVE METHODS 
 
As anticipated, this paragraph will briefly review and highlight some of the 
main features, potentials and pitfalls of qualitative studies, drawing a 
parallelism with quantitative whenever be useful.  
The key point and main contention of this paragraph is that the inner 
nature of qualitative analysis in comparative studies is their ability to 
provide a foundation for an integrated analysis.  
As anticipated, qualitative analysis is the analysis typically performed by 
“traditional” comparative legal scholars. Therefore, in our investigation, we 
will discuss it first.  
The first self-evident feature of what goes into the hotchpotch  of 
qualitative analysis, is that it is mainly built on logic and verbal reasoning. 
This feature gives to the researcher the opportunity to indulge in 
dialogical, historical and sociological digressions. Notwithstanding what 
above, especially in recent times, qualitative research design has also been 
built upon numerical104 premises105. Realism, especially at the end of the 
                                                          
104 J. Maxwell, op. cit..  
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last Century, supported the idea that the use of quantitative evidence in 
comparative works could have been the only way for building an objective, 
perfectly measurable and aseptic scholarship, able to provide a sound 
explanation for every iota of the legal world. Something a little bit too 
optimistic, maybe.  
In contrast, traditional comparative scholars found that their reasoning 
was perfectly grounded on scientific premises and saw no need for 
complementing their findings with quantitative alchemy.  
In addition, they often transferred their own ideologies in their writings, 
making it carefully to avoid the employment of quantitative tool because 
(generally) less maneuverable106.  
On technical grounds, reliable and complete datasets were also very 
difficult to be obtained. In more recent times, however, there has been an 
attempt by some traditional researchers to make qualitative research 
                                                                                                                                                       
105 Nonetheless, this methodological stream has always been considered 
(at least) controversial by the mainstream doctrine.  
 
106 On the other side, we shall not forget that “When qualitative researchers do 
publish politically uncomfortable results, a common response is to argue that because 
these results are not numerical, they are, therefore, “anecdotal,” and can be dismissed”. 
J. Maxwell, op. cit., p. 475.  
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scientific by imposing themselves measurements and benchmarks107, thus 
supporting  the inclusion of numbers their research.   
The initial mistrust can be contrasted with another consideration: it is 
likewise shocking that for such a long time it has been believed that a 
single case, albeit representative of a certain tendency, could rise to a 
generalizable conclusion.  Mere speculations based on single laws or 
judgments, which are deprived of any empirical evidence, frequency or 
pattern serve indeed almost to nothing more than filling academic reviews 
with wasted ink. 
In addition, it can be said that comparing all the countries on a qualitative 
basis might be a daunting enterprise as much as trying to operate 
quantitatively even in a world where the players of the game are a finite 
and relatively small number, since data availability might be (and often is) a 
problem for some of them108.  
Therefore, the “N-players” problem plays a fundamental role in the 
research design to be selected by the researcher.  
                                                          
107 G. King, R. Keohane, S. Verba, Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in 
qualitative research, Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
108 Certain states might have disappeared, other might be in transition, 
other might not exert an effective control on their territories and 
population. 
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On the other side, however daunting the task, the existence of a relatively 
small number of players advantages an observational study.  
In fact, the ideal of empiricism in comparative studies would be to possess 
detailed observations on all the subjects of a given study in order to be 
able to proceed to an atomistic comparison. However, this level is credibly 
not attainable. And indeed, we have anticipated that it is not the size of the 
sample which constitutes the line of demarcation between empirical and 
not empirical scholarship. 
From these premises, it can already be inferred that a comparative 
scholarship characterized by qualitative research only would be severely 
limited: the scholar might only conduct few in-depth analyses and might 
miss the big picture, thus ending up not being able to provide a sound 
general explanation or, worst of the cases, grounding his findings on the 
explanation given to individual cases, hence assigning a particular weight 
to outlier observations.  
On the other side, the analysis of single countries can provide 
counterexamples of  what resembles a necessary causal relationship109.  
This being sad, it appears that the main use of the qualitative tradition in 
comparative legal studies is mostly suited for case studies rather than for 
                                                          
109 H. Spamann, Empirical comparative law, 11 Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science, forthcoming 2015. 
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cross-case analysis, which comes instead of  help when analyzing central 
tendencies110.  
Case studies have indeed advantages that cannot be easily replicated when 
large samples are used, since the former allow for a better degree of 
knowledge regarding context-specific attributes111 that may be less relevant 
(or completely irrelevant) in the latter.  Moreover, they are less dependent 
on the availability of data.  
From the perspective of comparative law methodology case studies also 
have the distinct advantage of accounting for the fact that different legal 
systems may address the same problem in different ways: “by simply asking 
whether a particular legal provision exists or does not exist in another legal system, large 
                                                          
110 For a general discussion, see once again G. Goertz, J. Mahoney,  A tale 
of two cultures: Qualitative and quantitative research in the social sciences, Princeton 
University Press, 2012. 
 
111 According to H. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of 
Methodology, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 1025, 1998-1999, “Many disagreements  can  
emerge  from  the  choice  of  comparative variables. Any  two or more phenomena  may 
have a  multiplicity of potentially comparable  attributes. It  may be neither desirable  
nor practical  to  compare  all  of  these  attributes  simultaneously,  if  at all. Therefore,  
it  is  reasonable  that  comparisons  are  commonly more  selective  than configurative. 
Comparisons  tend  to  focus  on a  particular  subset  of  variables,  while  ignoring  
others.  Notwithstanding  their  significance,  these  comparative  variable  choices  are 
infrequently  explained  or justified”. 
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n-studies commits what is regarded as a cardinal error in comparative institutional 
analysis: they assume that there is only a single solution to a problem”112. 
Indeed, the same question might be solved in different identically-
functional ways by every single legal system.  
Case studies also do not require the researcher to identify a single 
parameter, variable or benchmark for all the objects of its study countries 
(such as time, languages, spaces), yet keeping a certain degree of 
confidence in general comparability.  
This constitutes also a challenge, since “the findings from qualitative work tend 
to be less generalizable because they are context specific”113 and may detect “causal  
and  other  explanatory mechanisms that statistical correlation  cannot capture”114. 
Without such mechanisms, “anecdotal evidence supplies a  risky  foundation  upon  
which  to  form  generalizations”115.   
                                                          
112
 K. Pistor, Rethinking the Law and Finance Paradigm, BYU L. Rev., 1647, 
2009, p. 1664. 
 
113 G. Shaffer, T. Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal 
Scholarship, 106 Am. J. of Int’l Law 1, 2012. 
114 J. Goldsmith, A. Vermeule, Empirical methodology and legal scholarship, Un. 
Chic. L. Rev. 153-167, 2002.  
115 M. Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 807, 1998.  
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The last disadvantage of qualitative studies over quantitative is that they 
cannot be replicated116 and therefore checked.  
Concluding on qualitative analysis, we must register that this method 
cannot stand per se, in se and ex se, but must be used as a foundation for 
quantitative analysis, which – as we will see in a moment – is currently 
benefiting of all the technical refinements and  funding  opportunities 
connected with data gathering and analysis.   
Qualitative work is thus important  for  generating  theories  which can be 
tested on quantitative grounds, without losing of sight the dynamics of 
social contexts. However, as we will see thereafter, triangulation, methods 
mixing and interdisciplinary cherry picking will enable the researcher  to  
“compare  different  kinds  of  data  from  different  sources  to  see  whether  they 
corroborate each other”117. 
 
 
 
                                                          
116 T. Jick, Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action, 
Administrative Science Quarterly 602-611, 1979. 
117 G. Shaffer, T. Ginsburg, op. cit.. 
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III. QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
 
A slightly longer passage is needed in order to address the issues related to 
quantitative analysis. That “legal systems depend heavily on useful numbers and 
calculations”118, does not come as a surprise.  
Legal systems are indeed filled with quantification (damages, penalties, 
years of conviction). Therefore the reliance of legal systems upon 
measurement is self-evident. Quantitative legal analysis comes out in 
various flavors, some harder (causal inference), some lighter (descriptive 
statistics), and  quantitative methods119 such as statistic and econometrics 
characterizes themselves by definition as tools of cross-case analysis, 
juxtaposed to within-case analysis, which – as we have seen above - 
involves the analysis of individual observations120.  
However, a fundamental caveat towards quantitative analysis is 
immediately necessary. We are prone to believe that empirical scholarship 
can more easily discern the normative from the descriptive and yet 
                                                          
118 R. Hastie, The Challenge to Produce Useful “Legal Numbers”, 8.1 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 6-20, 2011. 
119 For a review of the features of quantitative methods, once again see G. 
Goertz, J. Mahoney,  op. cit.. 
120 Quantitative approaches will therefore (generally) be a little more 
suitable for addressing macro-questions.  
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maintain its neutrality. However, in the own fortunate words of one the 
forefathers of Law and Economics , one can “torture the data, and it will 
confess to anything”121.  
This is true under many aspects. First of all, the aspect of measurement 
(i.e. the comparison of a given object with some predetermined standard).  
One first difficulty stems from the fact that we have to learn how to 
measure and then fix an appropriate unit of measurement122,  thereafter 
conceptualizing our measure so that it can capture the underlying data. 
Indeed, the same measure which we take as a benchmark, indicator123 or 
parameter means nothing unless we assign it a certain value. Before that, 
“everything  about  the  object  of study  is lost except  the  dimension  or  dimensions  
being  measured”124.  
                                                          
121 Ronald Coase, as cited in G. Tullock, A Comment on Daniel Klein's 'A Plea 
to Economists Who Favor Liberty', Eastern Economic Journal, 2001. 
122 “Although  numerical  summaries  can  be  convenient  and  concise, and  are  by  
definition  precise,  measurement  need  not involve  numbers-  as is  often the case in 
qualitative  research. Categorizations, such as "tall," "medium," and "short," or 
"Catholic,"  "Protestant," and "Jewish,"  are  reasonable  measures  that  can  be  very  
useful, assuming  researchers  sufficiently  define  the  standard  for  measurement  so  
that they (or  others) can  unambiguously apply  it” L. Epstein, G. King, op. cit.. 
  
123 Id est, quantitative measures of the performance of legal systems K. 
Davis, Legal indicators: the power of quantitative measures of law, 10 Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science 37-52, 2014.  
124
 L. Epstein, A. Martin, op. cit.. 
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Assigning values determines however that we abstract to a certain extent. 
When we do it, however, it becomes unavoidable our research question 
becomes “lightly or heavily scented with the values of those whose hands who are on 
the switch"125. How can we then be sure that such measure stays reliable and 
valid126? The concepts of reliability, equitability and predictability in 
relation to “legal numbers” can be tricky, and has up to now being an 
untraveled venture.  
This is really unfortunate, since establishing an appropriate measure entails 
careful measurement procedures and attention on the quality of the 
produced numbers.127 
Therefore, the problem stands also in bringing the right metrics to the law: 
the better the measure, the stronger the conclusions which we can infer.  
The difficulty for comparative scholars in designing and collecting 
consistent measurements has been well recognized because of the earlier 
failures in collecting and coding the data.  
                                                          
125 L. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement Author, 38 Stan. Law 
Rev. 3, 1986, p 763. 
126 For a general discussion on reliability and validity, see L. Epstein, G. 
King, op. cit. 
 
127 R. Hastie, op. cit.. 
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In particular, coding is the process of transforming the attributes and 
properties of observations into standardized, analyzable forms able to 
achieve “a close fit between the facts and the concept (validity) in a reproducible, 
consistent manner (reliability)128. Of course, there are  different methods for 
sampling and coding data. This gives a hint of the fact that coding law is 
always bound to a certain degree of subjectivity, in particular when it 
involves different legal systems as the comparative scholarship.  
This construction not shared by every author. Some argue that another 
caveat in the use of quantitative methods is related to hidden biases.129 
Researchers  may well (consciously or unconsciously) look for the 
observations that best fit their theories, thus creating a procrustean bed’s 
problem. 
Another serious concern relates to weak data, id est data which encourage 
weak or flawed inferences, that are statistically insignificant, or that are of 
extremely limited value and may be therefore misused. And this raises a 
second-level question: what if weak data are the only one which can be 
                                                          
128 H. Spamann, op. cit.. 
129 “In addition,  qualitative  work  may  be  viewed  as  untrustworthy  because  it  
reflects  the normative predispositions  of  the  observer  or  those  the  researcher  
interviews”. G. Shaffer, T. Ginsburg, op. cit.. See also  B. Geddes, How the 
Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative 
Politics, 2 Pol. Analysis 131, 1990.  
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extrapolated from the available resources? Some argue that such data shall 
be nonetheless reported, because should they prove consistent with other 
more grounded data, obtaining a double proof might always be useful130.  
Another tricky question is, as an example, whether optional rules shall be 
included in the analysis or not (thus counting only  default  and  
mandatory  rules)131.  
Another danger is that of reducing potential evidence to the amount of 
collected evidence. This aspect may is certainly critical for drawing the 
correct conclusions.  
Finally, a last caveat shall be raised against the rhetorical use of numbers, 
directed to making a claim appear more rigorous than it actually is. This 
may well happen also when we restrict our analysis to a given point in 
time, which may only reveal short-term trends.  
                                                          
130 “Sometimes reporting weak or preliminary data can spur further, more solid 
research. This may outweigh concerns about potential misunderstandings of the 
data.  And sometimes weak data is just one data point among many. Then, the risk 
that the data will be misused is smaller”, in D. Schwartz, Should Empirical Legal 
Scholars Have Special Responsibilities?, http://concurringopinions.com, May 8, 
2013.  
 
131 On this specific question, one can argue that optional rules  shall be 
taken into account when analyzing a given system because they are 
available to the “consumer”, id est the users. 
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Coming to the advantages of quantitative methods, we can immediately 
report that these are able to process large amounts of data, immediately 
“narrowing down the set of plausible theories”132.  
They can also be aggregated and disaggregated133 at the different levels 
needed (as an example, at a micro or macro level134). Aggregated data will 
therefore identify hidden patterns135  and suggest generalizable 
conclusions, whereas disaggregated data may serve for subgroups of 
observations. Data can be engineered both for comparing the policies of a 
number of countries, and for measuring the reaction of economic agents 
to exogenous changes in legislation136.  
Additionally, numbers typically add  precision to statements137 testing 
hypotheses against  large  datasets with  refined  techniques  which may be 
                                                          
132 H. Spamann, op. cit.. 
133 However, this is not always possible. 
 
134 Analysis at macro or micro level shall not be confused with the analysis 
public or private comparative law. 
 
135  W. Firestone, Meaning in method: The rhetoric of quantitative and qualitative 
research, 16.7 Educational researcher 16-21, 1987.  
 
136 B. Luppi, F. Parisi, Quantitative Methods in Comparative Law, in Minnesota 
Legal Studies Research Paper, 2012. 
 
137 “However, they do this at the cost of stripping away everything but the quantitative 
information and are thus necessarily complementary to qualitative information rather 
than substituting for it”, see J. Maxwell, op. cit..  
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unavoidable in order to establish robust causal relationships
138
. All in all, 
“numbers  provide less shelter  than words”139. What is more, differently from 
data obtained via qualitative methods, quantitative data present the 
advantage of being replicable140.  
Lastly, they have an easier stand for communicability, as they are a 
standardized form of evidence.  
IV. TRIANGULATION, METHODS MIXING AND  
INTERDISCIPLINARY CHERRY-PICKING. 
 
 In our review of the features, pitfalls and potentials of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, we have highlighted that much of the analysis to be 
conducted depends on the question to be assessed, which in turn is 
influenced by the availability of data.  
In order to build an integrated infrastructure of empirical comparative 
studies, comparative scholars may resort to different integrated techniques 
                                                          
138 M. Siems, Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
139 M. Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 807, 1998. 
 
140
 G. Mitchell, Empirical legal scholarship as scientific dialogue, 83 North Carol. 
Law Rev., 2004. 
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such as triangulation
141
,  id est the “employment of multiple methods and data 
sources in order to enhance the validity of findings”142, methods mixing, id est the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative tools to various degrees and 
interdisciplinary cherry-picking, id est the use of tools and techniques 
borrowed from other disciplines.  
As said above, a first opportunity available to comparative scholars for an 
improvement of the validity of their findings is triangulation. This method 
allows the researcher to cross-test its findings and thus cancel out potential 
biases and dismiss rival explanations. The result is that the validity of 
findings is self-reinforced via different processes. 
Methods mixing143, as we have highlighted above, is instead valuable 
especially for multilayered analyses: qualitative studies suit as a foundation 
to quantitative studies, which in turn gives breadth to the former and 
                                                          
141 The concept of triangulation was first introduced in a paper published 
by Webb et  al. in 1966 and then extensively discussed in 1978 by Denzin. 
According to Denzin, triangulation comes in four forms: data  
triangulation, investigator triangulation, theoretical triangulation and 
methodological triangulation.    
 
142 S. Mathison, Why triangulate?, 17.2 Educational researcher 13-17, 1988. 
143 With regard to mixing methods, see J. Greene, Engaging critical issues in 
social inquiry by mixing methods, 56.6 American Behavioral Scientist 755-773, 
2012. K. Howe, M. Eisenhart, Standards for qualitative (and quantitative) 
research: a prolegomenon, 19.4 Educational researcher 2-9, 1990; T. Jick, 
Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action, 
Administrative Science Quarterly 602-611, 1979. 
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provide valuable tools for defining the variables needed for testing and 
controlling for the hypotheses, finally synthetizing the findings in a 
generalizable, logically coherent, theory144. 
This methodological dialogue resulting from the overlapping of traditions 
on the one side generates a deeper understanding of social phenomena, 
and on the other side assures that the scholar can go fishing into teeming 
waters.   
Indeed, generating research on the sole basis of looming questions 
discounts an high risk of answering to useless questions, which is like on 
the one side having stockpiles of ink without a tool for making use of it, 
while on the other side having a fancy pen without ink.   
Lastly, interdisciplinary cherry-picking can be useful in that it allows the 
scholar to selectively borrow useful tools from other fields and readapt 
them to the needs of her scholarship.  
In the end, “[…] it would be unfortunate in this field to reproduce the hierarchies of 
methodology that have plagued other disciplines like sociology and political science”145. 
                                                          
144 See H. Brady, D. Collier (eds.), Rethinking  social  inquiry:  diverse  tools, 
shared standards, 2010; H. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of 
Methodology, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 1025, 1998-1999; G. King, R. Keohane, S. 
Verba, Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research, Princeton 
University Press, 1994. 
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Nonetheless, triangulation, methods mixing and interdisciplinary cherry-
picking have their own problems, the main one being that in order to be 
practiced, they require expertise in the respective techniques. And this is 
the reason why the on methodological grounds empirical comparative 
legal scholar shall become a Janus Bifrons. 
V. JANUS BIFRONS 
 
We shall shore ourselves out of the tyranny of single methods: empirical 
comparative analysis needs support from both capita of the same coin146, 
which (at least in comparative legal studies) have always been 
unfortunately considered as separate and conflicting147. 
In recent times H. Brady and D. Collier have depicted the general status of 
legal empiricism as follows: “the past decades have seen the emergence of an 
impressive spectrum of new techniques from quantitative analysis as well as strong 
resurgence of interest in developing and further refining the tools of qualitative 
                                                                                                                                                       
145 Comment posted by by L. Nielsen on Robert Nelson’s article on 
Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in Socio-legal Research, 
http://www.elsblog.org, 22 June 2006.  
146  In this sense, see W. Twining, The Idea of Juristic Method: A Tribute to Karl 
Llewellyn, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 119, 1993. 
147 See V. Palmer, op. cit..  M.  Reimann,  The End of Comparative Law as an 
Autonomous Subject, 11 Til. Eur.  & Civ. L.  F. 49, 1996. 
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research”
148
. The empirical turn of legal analysis thus aligns with a credibility 
revolution149 in empirical economics, which is focused  on research 
designs150. 
It is therefore expected that now more than ever in the past, there should 
be a methodological dialogue between the two,  directed towards their 
reunion under an empirical agenda aimed at rebutting the idea that in 
social sciences “there is not a set of principles that unifies scientific work”151 and 
foster cooperation between colleagues with different skills and traditions, 
in the consciousness that not all of the analytical goals of the legal 
comparative enterprise can be achieved simultaneously by simply “putting 
qualitative flesh on quantitative bones”152 and vice versa. Indeed, every 
discipline has specific methodological problems which are “unique to the 
                                                          
148 H. Brady, D. Collier (eds.), Rethinking  social  inquiry:  diverse  tools, shared 
standards, 2010, p. 125. See also G. Shaffer, T. Ginsburg, op. cit.; U. Mattei, 
A. Monti,  Comparative Law and Economics: Borrowing and Resistance, 1.2 
Global Jurist Frontiers, 2001. 
 
149 J. Angrist, J.-S. Pischke, The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: 
How Better Research Design Is Taking the Con out of Econometrics, 24 J. Econ. 
Persp. 3, 2010.  
150 See also J. Gelbach, J. Klick, Empirical Law and Economics, 2014. 
151 G. Goertz, J. Mahoney, op. cit., p. 220. 
 
152 H. Brady, D. Collier (eds.),  Rethinking  social  inquiry:  diverse  tools, shared 
standards,  2010, p. 106. 
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special concerns in that area”153. Comparative law makes no exception. 
Therefore, integration requires the modification to a certain extent of the 
methods which have been used up to now, with the primary end of 
producing testable predictions for the falsification of logically deductible 
theories. 
In this way, comparative law will be able to regenerate itself and find 
unexplored corners of law or corners to be enlightened in a different way 
in order to reexamine previously inferred theories: “the list of legal research 
questions that would benefit from empirical analysis already staggers and continues to 
grow”154.  
We shall now ask ourselves what are our frontiers and our goals, but first 
we need to rest from our journey. The caravanserai is finally waiting for us. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
153 H. Kritzer, The (nearly) forgotten early empirical legal research in Peter Cane & 
Herbert M. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research, 
Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 902. 
154 M. Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial 
Decision Making and the New Empiricism, U. Ill. L. Rev., 2002, p. 827. 
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CHAPTER III 
AT THE CARAVANSERAI: 
FRONTIERS AND GOALS OF  
EMPIRICAL COMPARATIVE LAW 
 
SUMMARY: I. At the caravanserai. - II. Frontiers - III. -An “ideal” law? -  
IV. Understanding, reform and unification. - V. The empirical comparative 
scholar: homo universalis. 
I. AT THE CARAVANSERAI 
 
Our journey through the emerging empirical comparative literature led us 
to an intermediate destination, which can also be regarded as the new 
starting point from which to resume the analysis. Like the caravans in the 
desert we shall now rest a bit from our travel: the caravanserai is waiting 
for us.  
At this point, it should be already clear that the empirical comparative 
enterprise cannot be taken with a “just do it” versus “just don’t” do it 
approach155.  
                                                          
155 “Economists, as well as other social scientists, have also tried to measure legal rules 
and institutions. Their approach is often a ‘just do it’ one, implicitly assuming that the 
complexity of the law does not prevent it from being turned into numbers. Many legal 
academics,  by  contrast,  have  the  attitude  of  ‘just  don’t  do  it’,  for  instance,  
bluntly saying that ‘law is about things that are not quantifiable’”. M. Siems, 
Measuring the Immeasurable: How to Turn Law into Numbers, in M. Faure, J. 
Smits (eds.) Does law matter? On law and economic growth, Intersentia, 
2011. 
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The scholarship must be handled, safeguarded and promoted with 
attention. Also, it must be not identified as and the one and only possible 
epiphany of comparative legal studies: simply put, it is not. Empirical 
analysis is not the promised land of comparative scholars. 
Many will happily keep running the traditional analysis that they have been 
conducting for many of their academic years.  
Yet, empirical comparative studies may humbly serve to those who want 
to take advantage of technology and update their methodological toolkits, 
employing the new tools which allow us to inject life into what we had 
considered a byproduct of traditional research, data, as well as into the 
older blunt tools of the past. This is light of enabling the scholars to deal 
with a brand new wide array of open questions which can serve as a 
methodological guide towards a better understanding, reform and 
unification.  
II. FRONTIERS 
 
We have now reached the pillars of Hercules of the scholarship, and shall 
now briefly discuss (at least some) potential new directions. A first topic 
located at the frontiers of comparative empiricism there are longitudinal 
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studies. Our claim is that the analysis of comparative law has often missed 
one of its fundamental axes: time156. 
However, a diachronic perspective in empirical works becomes  inevitable, 
as descriptive research necessarily deals with data that have been collected 
in some moment of the past157 and,  in ascertaining the effects of a given 
rule,  explanatory research cannot disregard its evolution over time. 
Nonetheless, too often comparative scholar have made use of cross 
sectional research, which just examines data at a single point in time. On 
the contrary, they have often neglected time series, which serve for 
contrasting the observed phenomenon over time, in order to find out its 
hidden patterns and trends and hence overcome the structural limitations 
of static models.  
                                                          
156 For a brief discussion of the topic see R. Cooter, T. Ginsburg, Why the 
same laws are longer in some countries than others, U. Ill. Law & Econ. Research 
Paper LE 03-012, 2003, esp. p. 23 and 24. 
 
157 See D. Klerman, Economic Analysis of Legal History, in USC Class 
Research Paper No. 14-15, 2014; M. Siems, Statistische Rechtsvergleichung, in 
Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht/The 
Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law, 354-390, 
2008, esp. p. 390. 
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A second topic regards the role of behavioral analysis, intended as the 
understanding of the mechanisms which regulate human behavior, 
especially in respect to judgment and decision making.   
It has been correctly observed that comparative scholars are “already 
capitalizing on research in behavioral economics by using this research’s insights on how 
people actually behave – as opposed to mere  hypothesized  behavior  –  as  a  basis  for  
evaluating  the  effectiveness  (or efficiency) of supranational rules or doctrines”158. 
Therefore, it is relevant to ask ourselves whether (at least some) the 
methodological pitfalls of comparative law might be solved with the help 
of behavioral insights. 
First of all, behavioral analysis can give us a better idea of the cultural 
variables embedded in human behavior at both a macro and a micro level 
and hence express measures which are more respondent to the needs of 
regulation (or de-regulation) than the synthetic variables employed by 
current empirical projects159. 
                                                          
158 J. DE CONINCK, Reinvigorating Comparative Law through Behavioral 
Economics? A Cautiously Optimistic View, 7.3 Review of Law & Economics, 
2011, p. 712. 
 
159
 See supra, chapter I, para. II.  
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Because of the fact that cultural variables are located outside of legal 
systems, they can also be considered more neutral and therefore provide 
an aseptic and reliable description of functional problems. 
A third possible frontier is that of identifying field-specific tools160 which 
can be especially suitable for comparative legal studies.   
Tools that - moving from the consciousness that legal systems provide 
many different solutions to the same problem - will  be able to identify 
functional equivalents and overcome the boundaries imposed by the 
knowledge of the researchers conducting the study
161
. 
Lastly, it seems unavoidable the creation of an integrated jargon which 
deconstructs legal notions, assures that all of their founding elements are 
represented among the components162 and reduces terminological 
differences amongst jurisdictions by attributing a more pragmatic and 
uniform signification of the concepts being considered163.  
                                                          
160 On the need of which, see U. Mattei, A. Monti,  Comparative Law and 
Economics: Borrowing and Resistance, 1.2 Global Jurist Frontiers, 2001. 
161 K. Pistor, Rethinking the Law and Finance Paradigm, BYU L. Rev., 1647, 
2009. 
162 See J. Vanderlinden, Comparer les droits, Kluwer Belgique 1995. 
163 For a discussion of which see R. Sacco, One Hundred Years of Comparative 
Law, 75 Tulane Law Review, 2001.  
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III. AN “IDEAL” LAW? 
 
Let us recall part of our previous cogitations. The consideration that 
different solutions are used in order to address functionally equivalent 
problems reveals us that, all in all, there is not a single best rule
164 which 
can fit all of the legal systems into which it is imported.  
As different countries make use of different metrics (kilograms and 
pounds; meters and yards), and yet manage to trade with each other at a 
global level, it is likewise not necessary that a single measure is established 
in respect to all the countries for comparisons to take place. 
Indeed, a one-sized model which can be used for each country does not 
exist.  Even if we formulate a given problem in the most neutral of  
possible languages, still we cannot obtain an universally workable single 
solution. This is because most of the questions are contingent to the 
spatial and temporal framework within which they emerge165. 
                                                          
164 B. Luppi, F. Parisi, Quantitative Methods in Comparative Law, in Minnesota 
Legal Studies Research Paper, 2012. 
 
165 R. Michaels, The Second Wave of Comparative Law and Economics?, 59 
University of Toronto Law Journal 2, 197-213, 2009, p. 204. 
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Certainly, a good rule may be identified from the fact that it remains in 
force: legal systems perpetuate the  selection of increasingly more efficient 
rules166.  
Efficiency, however, is just one the possible benchmarks (or tertia 
comparationis
167
), against to which different legal systems can be 
measured
168
. 
By using efficiency as a benchmark, we can isolate the variables which 
contribute to or detract from the relative efficiency of those systems and 
solutions, and discuss the benefits or drawbacks of those variables169 in 
order to develop a model, test and falsify it. 
                                                          
166
  F. Parisi, V. Fon, The economics of lawmaking, Oxford University Press, 
2009, p. 97. 
 
167 Other Authors such as Chodosh, op. cit., p. 1107, use prototypes of law 
as “efficient tertia comparations”.  
 
168 According to K. Pistor, Rethinking the Law and Finance Paradigm, BYU L. 
Rev., 1647, 2009, “by simply asking whether a particular legal provision exists or 
does not stem, large n-studies commit what is widely regarded as a cardinal error in 
comparative institutional analysis: they assume that there is only a  single solution to a 
problem”. See also N. Jansen, Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge, in 
Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law, 2006, p. 305. 
169 C. Rogers, Gulliver's Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of Comparative Law, 
67 George Washington Law Review 149, 1998.  
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Comparative scholarship can also assess the performance of legal rules on 
the basis of alternative criteria. For example, an hypothetical polarity can 
be created in relation to the concept of fairness
170
.  
The same meaning of fair remains of course more than debatable. 
However, the main point of this construction would be to link the ideal 
optimum to moral values more than to economic notions
171
. 
IV. UNDERSTANDING, UNIFICATION AND REFORM  
 
The reflection on fairness outlined above makes us aware of another 
necessary aspect of empirical comparative research, is to say that it embeds 
                                                          
170 For an analysis of fairness in law and economics, see L. Fennell, R. 
McAdams, Fairness in Law and Economics: Introduction, in Fairness in Law and 
Economics (Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams eds.), Edward 
Elgar, 2013 and T. Ulen, Law and economics, the moral limits of the market, and 
threshold deontology, in Law and Economics: Philosophical Issues and 
Fundamental Questions, 2015. 
171 For a discussion of values in comparative law se J.B. Fischman, Reuniting 
'Is' And 'Ought' In Empirical Legal Scholarship in University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 162(1), 2013, p. 158: “In any of these pursuits, however, the importance of 
the research must be assessed by reference to values. This is not to say that  empiricists  
must  personally  take  controversial  positions  in  normative debates;  one  can  
acknowledge  the  viewpoints  held  by  others  without endorsing them. It is not too 
much to ask, however, that empirical research proceed in a conscious recognition of the 
values it intends to serve, and that scholars make efforts to clarify how their findings 
relate to the values that motivated their research”. 
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a certain degree of political ideology172: indeed, institutions can influence 
the outcome of comparative research by “placing constraints on what can be 
done […], persuading researchers to undertake only policy relevant research, that is 
defining the problem in terms seen as appropriate by the dominant institution; and 
requiring research findings to be expressed in terms of variables over which the 
institution has a measure of control”173. 
The self-reinforcing spiral from institutions to legal rules and from rules to 
institutions exerts a considerable potential in influencing public policy174. 
The willingness to climb a ranking can lead to dangerous race to the 
bottom among countries, carried out by mean of wrong or useless 
reforms, which may well end up in neglecting the real needs of a definite 
                                                          
172 “Empirical law and economics can provide a useful guidance for the calibration of 
policies and the design of legal institutions”, see B. Luppi, F. Parisi, Quantitative 
Methods in Comparative Law, in Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper, 
2012. See also M. Mcconville, Development of empirical techniques and theory in 
research methods for law, in M. McConville, W Chui (eds.), Research methods 
for law, Edinburgh University Press, 2010, esp. p. 224 and M. Heise, The 
Importance of Being Empirical, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 807, 1998. 
 
173 See M. Mcconville, Development of empirical techniques and theory in research 
methods for law, in M. McConville, W Chui (eds.), Research methods for law, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010, esp. p. 213. 
 
174 L. Gordon, The Empiricists Legal Scholars at the Forefront of Data-Based 
Research, 2010, https://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edu/2010/05/the-
empiricists. 
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legal system, as it has been the case for certain aspects of the Doing Business 
reports175. 
The empirical comparative scholarship shall therefore aim towards (i) a 
better understanding of  status quos ; (ii) a reduction of the differences of 
legal concepts, ideally directed to their unification and (iii)a series of 
reforms ameliorative of legal systems176. 
 
V. THE EMPIRICAL COMPARATIVE SCHOLAR:  
HOMO UNIVERSALIS  
 
Comparative legal scholars shall therefore assume a subversive role in 
respect to the legal establishment177 both with regard to the means and 
ends they advocate for,  and both with regard to their approach to the 
scholarship.  
                                                          
175 See supra, chapter I, para. II. See also M. Siems, Statistische 
Rechtsvergleichung, in Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales 
Privatrecht/The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private 
Law, 354-390, 2008, esp. p. 390. 
 
176 Since these three goals are conceptually autonomous, they may also be 
pursued independently of each another. 
 
177 G. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, in Am. J.  Comp. 
Law, 683-700, 1998. 
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They shall (re)gain a role of social engineers178, developing an integrated 
methodology built upon synergism between different disciplines. In the 
future, comparative scholars will be able to justify their existence as a 
species only and if they will be able to better their understanding of the 
world as it is and as it ought to be.  
This is not an easy task: nowadays we live in a world which presents many 
more complexities than it used to be in the past.  
Therefore, scholars must soak into themselves the basic tenet which 
characterized humanist academia during Renaissance: the construction of 
an homo universalis. One who delves into complex bodies of knowledge with 
an unquenchable thirst for knowledge and  an imaginative mind. A scholar 
who goes takes on his shoulders a rounded education in order to achieve 
the polymathic traits which enable him to acquire solid skills in different 
fields and methods. Such personalities being around, technology will have 
a long and difficult task in getting ahead of human beings. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
178
 R. Pardolesi, M. Granieri, The Future of Law Professors and Comparative 
Law, in The Digest. National Italian American Bar Association Law 
Journal 1-26, 2013. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Finally, we note down the impressions of our journey. We can start with a 
quote which wraps it up pretty well: “The new legal empiricism could yet falter 
and fade, as have other legal empiricism before it. The new legal empiricism could also 
triumph, emerging as both a dominant force within the legal academy and a valid, 
methodologically rigorous, and conceptually rich social science in its own right.  Or the 
new legal empiricism could become a niche venture”179. A plain truth. 
In sum, this work has highlighted the hand protruded by empiricism to 
comparative legal studies - by nature an anti-dogmatic enterprise180 -in 
order for them to regain traction as an autonomous scholarship. 
Notwithstanding, this work has also given accounts of the limitations of 
the armchair empiricism fostered by “the new almighty producers of global law, 
the international institutions of global governance”181.   
Also, it has reported the uncertainties shadowing its methodologies and 
goals. Empirical scholars shall thus beware of dogmatism in realist’s 
                                                          
179 M. Suchman, E. Mertz, A New Legal Empiricism? Assessing ELS and 
NLR, in Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 6, 2010.  
180 R. Pardolesi, M. Granieri, The Future of Law Professors and Comparative 
Law, in The Digest. National Italian American Bar Association Law 
Journal 1-26, 2013. 
181 U. Mattei, A. Monti,  Comparative Law and Economics: Borrowing and 
Resistance, 1.2 Global Jurist Frontiers, 2001, p. 15. 
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clothing, as data can lie (or be used for lying) and yet keep a glaze of 
plausibility.  
Indeed, by way of empirical analysis scholars are now enabled to 
harmonize their theories with their observations, but must not forget that 
data have be handled carefully in order to keep the analysis effective.   
Therefore, the leading role in this enterprise does not rest on the 
scholarship, but rather on its scholars. It is up to them to crave for 
becoming polymaths in order to exert their dominion on sciences, and not 
let science exert its dominion on them.  
How to do it effectively is suggested by a champion in the subversion  of 
reactionary hegemonies: “educate yourselves because we’ll need all our intelligence. 
Agitate because we’ll need all our enthusiasm. Organize yourselves because we’ll need all 
our strength.”182.  
Education, activism and organization: if the scholars will abide to these 
prescriptions, we are optimist that also for comparative legal studies “legal 
empiricism’s current incarnation will not merely survive; it will flourish”183.  
 
 
                                                          
182 A. Gramsci, L’Ordine Nuovo, I, 1 May 1919 (translated from Italian). 
 
183 M. Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial 
Decision Making and the New Empiricism , U. Ill. L. Rev., 2002, p. 849. 
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